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Frustrated at the interface between court litigation and arbitration?  
Don’t blame it on Brussels I! 
Finding reason in the decision of West Tankers, and the recast Brussels I 
Youseph Farah1 and Sara Hourani2 
 
1. Introduction 
The West Tankers decision was criticised for having a regressive impact on the system of 
international commercial arbitration. Many had hoped that the European Court would deliver 
a decision which would be informed by pragmatism, and one which would prevent numerous 
court and tribunal related parallel proceedings occurring across a number of jurisdictions 
within the EU. Instead, the European Court delivered a principled judgment declaring an anti-
suit injunction prohibiting a party from continuing proceedings before a court of a Member 
State to be contrary to EU law.3 
This article is significant because it introduces a complete account of the normative 
framework that regulates the interface between court litigation and arbitration. It identifies 
the approach under the system of the Brussels I Regulation, including the recent amendments 
brought by the revised version of Brussels I. The main finding of this article is that the 
reasoning of the European Court in West Tankers was consistent with EU jurisprudence, and 
the core values of Brussels I.  In particular it shows that the critiques of West Tankers often 
ignore important values that are fundamental to the system of Brussels I, and EU 
constitutional values. 
It is submitted that West Tankers has essentially magnified the diversity and cultural 
distinction among Member States in their approach to parallel proceedings between a court 
and arbitration. It is this very distinction that led to the unwelcome procedural inefficiencies 
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which accompanied West Tankers and its related actions, and it is this very weakness in the 
normative framework that must be addressed.  
The authors reiterate that the relationship between international arbitration and Brussels I is 
primarily one of scope. However, what is often overlooked is that, from a theoretical 
standpoint, the debate is equally about values. Brussels I is based on certain values that drive 
the internal market into a system which improves access to justice, and eliminates 
unnecessary conflicting decisions. It is one which strikes a balance between power theories 
and fairness theories. It is further a system which is founded on mutual trust and confidence 
between Member States.4 It will be seen that these values clash with the values that are 
attributed to the system of international commercial arbitration, and therefore it will be 
challenging to find solutions to the jurisdictional clash identified above under the system of 
Brussels I. 
Accordingly, this research identifies solutions which will best co-exist with the values of 
Brussels I. This is done against the backdrop of the recast Brussels I,5 which came into force 
in January 2015. In particular, it is submitted that according greater deference to the arbitral 
tribunal by greater movement towards the doctrines of ‘prima facie review’ and ‘negative 
competence-competence’ should mitigate some of the procedural inefficiencies that are likely 
to arise in situations similar to West Tankers. 
 
2. The Issue in West Tankers and Related Actions 
In August 2000, the Front Comor, a vessel owned by West Tankers and chartered by Erg 
Petroli SpA (‘Erg’) collided in Italy with a jetty owned by Erg and caused damage. Erg 
recovered compensation from its insurers (Allianz and Generali) up to the limit of its 
insurance cover and commenced arbitration proceedings in London against West Tankers for 
the difference between the compensated amount and the actual loss in accordance with the 
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the administration of justice. 
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charter-party agreement between the parties, which contained an arbitration clause providing 
for all or any disputes to be settled by arbitration in London. West Tankers denied liability 
for the damage caused by the collision. Allianz and Generali brought proceedings in 
subrogation under Italian law on 30 July 2003 against West Tankers before the Tribunale di 
Siracusa (Italy) in order to recover the sums they had paid to Erg. West Tankers raised an 
objection of lack of jurisdiction on the basis of the existence of the arbitration agreement.  
 In parallel, on 10 September 2004, West Tankers brought proceedings before the High Court 
of Justice of England and Wales, seeking a declaration that the dispute between itself, on the 
one hand, and Allianz and Generali, on the other, was to be settled by arbitration pursuant to 
the arbitration agreement. West Tankers also sought an anti-suit injunction restraining 
Allianz and Generali from pursuing any proceedings other than arbitration and requiring 
them to discontinue the proceedings commenced in Italy. The High Court allowed West 
Tankers’ claims and granted the anti-suit injunction sought against Allianz and Generali. The 
respondents in return appealed against that judgment to the House of Lords. Their central 
argument was that the anti-suit injunction was contrary to Brussels I and EU law. 
Pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the House 
of Lords made a preliminary reference to the European Court, asking whether “it is 
incompatible with Regulation No 44/2001 for a court of a member state to make an order to 
restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings before the courts of another 
member state on the ground that such proceedings would be contrary to an arbitration 
agreement, even though article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation excludes arbitration from the scope 
thereof”.6 
In parallel, the proceedings in arbitration were continued in London by West Tankers. The 
tribunal reached an award containing a negative declaration that in accordance with the 
charter-party agreement, which was determined to be governed by English law, West 
Tankers was not liable to the subrogated insurers under the terms of the charter-party 
agreement. West Tankers sought enforcement under section 66 of the (English) Arbitration 
Act 1996, requesting the High Court in London to order that the arbitrators' award be made a 
judgment. The motive behind such a request was “to provide themselves with an additional 
weapon in the Italian proceedings and/or a shield against enforcement if those proceedings 
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were to result in a judgment opposite to that arrived at by the arbitrators, i.e. a judgment that 
the owners were to blame for the collision”.7 
The insurer defended by stating that, since the award was merely declaratory, it could not be 
enforced under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The Court of Appeal confirmed 
however that under section 66 courts have the power to order judgments to be entered in the 
terms of an arbitral award even when the award is merely declaratory.8  
A number of related proceedings followed, engaging both the English courts and arbitral 
proceedings in London. These will be discussed later in this article. Subsequently, the arbitral 
tribunal published a fourth partial award concerning two further issues between the parties, 
and held that the tribunal’s jurisdiction was circumscribed pursuant to the reasoning of the 
court of the European Union in West Tankers, which it held also extended to the grant of 
equitable damages by the tribunal for breach of the arbitration agreement by Allianz, and any 
award concerning the difference in any monetary award in favour of Allianz by the Italian 
court and West Tankers’ liability. The tribunal reasoned that exercise of jurisdiction would be 
in breach of the principle of effective judicial protection, which it held was engaged by the 
fact that the defendant had a right under Article 5(3) (now Article 7(2)) of the Brussels I 
Regulation to pursue its proceedings before the Italian court: “Accordingly, we are driven to 
the conclusion that Community law would not allow an arbitral tribunal, although exercising 
a parallel jurisdiction, to cross the divide and in effect 'punish' a party for pursuing a course 
that the European Court itself had approved”.9  
Following the tribunal’s award, West Tankers appealed against that award to the High Court 
in London pursuant to section 69 of the (English) Arbitration Act 1996.The Commercial 
Court in London held that “the tribunal was not deprived, by reason of European law, of the 
jurisdiction to award equitable damages for breach of the obligation to arbitrate”.10 
                                                          
7 West Tankers Inc.  v Allianz SpA [2012] EWCA Civ 27, paragraph 12. 
 
8 West Tankers Inc. v Allianz SpA [2012] EWCA Civ 27. 
 
9 Paragraph 78 of the fourth arbitral award in West Tankers Inc. v Allianz SpA [2012] EWCA Civ 27. 
 
10 West Tankers Inc. v Allianz SpA [2012] EWCA Civ 27, paragraphs 51-78. 
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Meanwhile, West Tankers approached the Italian court with a request for the recognition and 
enforcement of the third award under the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). Allianz has challenged those proceedings.  
The case of West Tankers and its related actions, whether in litigation or in arbitration, 
manifest the inefficiencies likely to arise in complex parallel proceedings. Whilst the 
probability of parallel proceedings is rather small, it is by no means trivial. The following is a 
brief summary of proceedings that have occurred either in parallel or in series, and which 
have concerned similar or related matters. 
• (1) Proceedings based on subrogation brought by the insurers before a national court 
[Proceedings in Italy]. 
• (2) Arbitral proceedings in London concerning the same or similar subject matter as 
the subrogation proceedings before the Italian court. 
• (3) Proceedings brought before the High Court of Justice in England requiring a party 
to cease judicial proceedings and resolve the dispute by arbitration [the anti-suit 
injunction before the English Court], which were appealed to the House of Lords, and 
ultimately referred to the European Court. 
• (4) Enforcement proceedings in respect of an arbitral award holding that West 
Tankers was not liable to Erg in accordance with the charter-party agreement which 
were brought before the High Court in London, and later appealed to the Court of 
Appeal. 
• (5) Proceedings before an arbitral tribunal in London for damages for the breach of 
the arbitration agreement, and a declaration that the ship owners [West Tankers] were 
not liable for the difference between the sum awarded by the Italian courts and its 
liability, if found, owed to Erg. 
• (6) Enforcement proceedings in respect of an arbitral award in an EU Member State, 
concerning a debt for which the very foundation is pending before a national court of 
an EU Member State [the Italian Proceedings]. 
• (7) Proceedings concerning the London award brought before a national court in Italy. 
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• (8) Appeal on a question of law under section 69 of the (English) Arbitration Act 
before the High Court in London challenging the fourth arbitral award which held that 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal was circumscribed by the decision of the European 
Court [High Court in London]. 
 
3. The Legal Issues leading to the European Court’s Judgment in West Tankers 
Before we are able to appreciate the European Court’s reasoning in West Tankers, it is 
important to assess the reasoning which was given by the English High Court for its decision 
to order Allianz and Generali to cease litigation in Italy and submit to arbitration in London, 
and which was later endorsed, albeit symbolically, by the House of Lords when making a 
preliminary reference to the European Court. It is important to understand this, because only 
then will we be able to measure the impact that West Tankers has had on international 
arbitration.   
 
3.1 The Reasoning of the English Courts 
The respondents in the case [Allianz and Generali] submitted at the High Court in London, 
among other claims, that the injunction should be discharged because it would be the duty of 
the Italian court to stay the proceedings brought before it in accordance with Article II(3) of 
the New York Convention 1958 if satisfied that the proceedings were brought in breach of a 
valid arbitration agreement and which was binding on Allianz and Generali. The respondents 
argued that Article II(3) of the New York Convention left it to the “courts where the court 
proceedings had been commenced to determine whether those proceedings should be stayed 
and where that court was [a court of] a Member State of the EU it would be inappropriate to 
anticipate the determination of that issue by an anti-suit injunction.”11 
 The respondents further argued that granting an anti-suit injunction would be incompatible 
with Brussels I and with “the philosophy underlying the ECJ in the decision of Turner v 
Grovit”.12 Moreover, the respondent submitted that “the granting of an anti-suit injunction by 
                                                          
11 West Tankers Inc v RAS (Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurtà) SpA and others, 'The Front Comor' [2005] EWHC 454 
(Comm), paragraph 42. 
 
12 Note 9, paragraphs 13 and 42.  See also Case C-159/02: Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565. 
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the English courts would be regarded by the Italian courts as an unacceptable interference 
by the English courts in their procedures and should therefore be refused by analogy 
with principles advanced by Turner v Grovit”.13  
The High Court rejected these submissions, holding that Turner v Grovit concerned an 
application for an anti-suit injunction restraining litigation in Spain in breach of an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement which itself fell within the scope of Brussels I. Accordingly, the court 
held that Turner v Grovit does not apply to an anti-suit injunction ordering a party to cease 
foreign litigation where that party was in breach of an arbitration agreement14. The House of 
Lords, in relation to the same issue, stated that: “In extending the application of the 
Regulation to orders made in proceedings to which the Regulation does not apply, [the 
submission] goes far beyond the reasoning in Gasser and Turner v Grovit and ignores the 
practical realities of commerce.”15 
In relation to whether the anti-suit injunction would amount to an unacceptable interference 
in the Italian proceedings, the High Court reiterated the finding in the Angelic Grace16 and 
stated that “whatever terminology is adopted – ‘offended’, ‘affronted’ or ’contrary to comity’ 
– evidence that the foreign court would treat the order as an impermissible exercise of 
jurisdiction by the English courts is, as a matter of English conflicts rules, not in itself any 
reason to withhold such an order to procure compliance with an agreement to arbitrate”.17 It 
will be seen below that this indifference to the sovereignty of Italian courts could offend 
some of the core values of Brussels I, and therefore give rise to a clash with EU law. 
It is important to note that the High Court, after careful consideration of the claims of both 
parties, found that the tort action before the Italian court was inconsistent with the owner’s 
right and that the matter should be determined by London arbitration. The court’s sentiment 
was clearly supportive of international arbitration. The court reiterated the approach adopted 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
13 Note 9. 
 
14 Note 9, paragraph 5. 
 
15 West Tankers Inc v RAS (Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurtà) and others[2007] ILPr 20, paragraph 15. 
 
16 Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA, The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 87 (CA). 
 
17 West Tankers Inc v RAS (Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurtà) and another, 'The Front Comor' [2005] EWHC 454 
(Comm), paragraph 51. 
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by English law in the Angelic Grace18 that such a right is to be protected by injunctive relief 
in equity unless strong reasons are shown to the contrary. In relation to the latter, the court 
stated that the right to an anti-suit injunction is unlikely to be displaced by the fact that Italy 
is a more appropriate forum for litigation because the evidence relevant to the cause of action 
may be ‘exclusively or substantially’ located in Italy.  
3.2  Brussels I and Parallel Proceedings between Court Litigation and Arbitration  
Before critically assessing the European Court’s decision in West Tankers, it is helpful to 
provide a detailed analysis of the EU’s earlier jurisprudence which informed the court’s 
reasoning in West Tankers. Brussels I, by Articles 29-34 (ex 27-29), offers solutions to 
parallel proceedings between similar or related causes of action involving the same parties 
when such proceedings are brought in the courts of different Member States. However, 
Brussels I does not have a specific solution to the interface between arbitration and court 
litigation as manifested in the West Tankers dispute. Thus, much hung on the delineation of 
the scope between Brussels I and arbitration. This means that where Brussels I is found to be 
inapplicable, national arbitration law should decide on the treatment of such parallel 
proceedings. Having said this, EU law continues to have a residual role even if the matter 
falls outside the scope of Brussels I, as will be seen later in this chapter. 
 
3.2.1  Article 1(2)(d) of Brussels I 
Most leading reports on the interpretation of Brussels I explained that the exclusion of 
arbitration from Brussels I was intended to avoid the overlap between Brussels I and binding 
treaty law on international commercial arbitration, and particularly the New York Convention 
195819. The Jenard report, for example, stated that such exclusion of arbitration from the 
scope of the Brussels Convention (now the Brussels I Regulation) applies in particular to 
proceedings involving the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, or proceedings to 
set aside an arbitral award, or the recognition of a judgment given in such proceedings. 
However, it must be acknowledged that the Jenard report was somewhat vague in relation to 
                                                          
18 Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA, The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 87 (CA). 
 
 19 The Jenard Report on the Brussels Convention, [1979] OJC59/1), at p 13. 
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resolving the interface between court litigation under Brussels I and arbitration. The report 
stated in paragraph D that: 
“The Brussels Convention does not apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards (see the definition in Article 25); it does not apply for the purpose of determining the 
jurisdiction of courts and tribunals in respect of litigation relating to arbitration for example, 
proceedings to set aside an arbitral award; and, finally, it does not apply to the recognition 
of judgments given in such proceedings”.20 
In the period leading up to the accession of the UK to the Brussels Convention, a committee 
led by Lord Kilbrandon advised that the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels 
Convention ‘should be understood in the widest sense’.21This ‘widest sense’ contention was 
later fleshed out by the UK to include ‘all disputes which the parties had effectively agreed 
should be settled by arbitration, including any secondary disputes connected with the agreed 
arbitration’.22 On the other hand, the original Member States of the EU favoured an approach 
whereby the exclusion related only to court proceedings in a Member State concerning 
arbitration, whether concluded, in progress or to be started.23 
The Schlosser report stressed that the term ‘arbitration’ in Article 1 cannot extend to every 
dispute that is affected by an arbitration agreement. It stipulated that the term merely refers to 
arbitration proceedings.24 The report drew a distinction between proceedings that were 
directly concerned with arbitration and proceedings that only incidentally raised the 
arbitration agreement. Proceedings that were directly concerned with arbitration as the 
principal issue, e.g. the establishment of the tribunal, the annulment or the recognition of the 
validity or defectiveness of an award, were outside the scope of the Brussels Convention. 
However, the verification, as an incidental question, of the validity of an arbitration 
agreement that was relied on by a litigant in order to contest the jurisdiction of the court 
                                                          
20 Note 16, paragraph D. 
 
21 See the Report of the Committee on the European Judgments Convention (October 1973), paragraph 72. 
 
22 See the Schlosser report, [1979] OJ C59/71, paragraph 61. 
 
23 Note 16, paragraph 61. 
 
24 Note 16, paragraph 62. 
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before which he was being sued pursuant to the Brussels Convention fell within the scope of 
the Convention25. 
Thus it is clear under EU jurisprudence that Article 1(2)(d) of Brussels I excludes from the 
scope of the Regulation proceedings whose principal subject matter is arbitration.26 In Marc 
Rich & Co v Società Italiana Impianti,27 which concerned the application of the lis pendens 
principles under Article 27 (now Article 29) of Brussels I, the plaintiff was summoned by the 
defendant to appear before the Regional Court of Genoa, Italy, in an action for a declaration 
that it was not liable to Marc Rich. In return, Marc Rich commenced arbitration proceedings 
in London, in accordance with an arbitration agreement between the parties. The defendant 
refused to take part in the proceedings, which led the plaintiff to commence proceedings 
before the High Court in London for the appointment of an arbitrator, pursuant to section 
18(2) of the (English) Arbitration Act 1996. Impianti disputed the validity of the arbitration 
agreement and argued that such a dispute, in accordance with Article 2 (now Article 4) of the 
Brussels I Regulation, should be adjudicated in Italy. Marc Rich, on the other hand, took the 
view that the dispute fell outside the scope of the Regulation, invoking Article 1(2)(d). 
 
The European Court stated that, in order to decide whether the proceedings fall outside the 
scope of the Regulation, reference must be made solely to the subject matter of the dispute. If 
the subject matter of the dispute falls outside the scope of the Regulation, such as a dispute 
concerning the appointment of an arbitrator, or a declaration regarding the validity of the 
arbitration agreement, then the proceeding is not within the scope of the Regulation. The 
court then examined the case before it, and ruled that: ‘the fact that a preliminary issue relates 
to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement does not affect the exclusion from the 
scope of the Convention of a dispute concerning the appointment of an arbitrator’.28 
A decision by the European Court, in Van Uden Maritime v Deco-Line, concerning the 
relationship between Article 1(2)(d) and Article 31 (now Article 35) of Brussels I regarding 
                                                          
25 See also the Evrigenis and Kerameus report, [1986] OJ C298/1, paragraph 35. 
 
26 See Stone P., EU Private International Law, 3rd edition, Elgar European Law, 2014, at p. 39. See also Case C-
190/89: Marc Rich v Impianti [1991] ECR I-3855. 
 
27 Case C-190/89: [1991] ECR I-3855. 
 
28 Case C-190/89: Marc Rich v Società Italiana Impianti [1991] ECR I-3855, paragraphs 26-28. 
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provisional measures, was argued on the basis of the Schlosser Report.29 The court stated that 
the Regulation does not apply to judgments determining the validity of an arbitration 
agreement, the revocation, amendment, recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards, or 
ancillary matters to arbitration, such as the appointment or dismissal of an arbitrator.30 The 
European Court determined that the subject matter of the dispute was the payment of arrears, 
contractually agreed by the parties, and thus fell within the ratione materiae of Brussels I. 
Based on the reasoning in Marc Rich, the court decided that Article 35 (ex 31) may confer 
jurisdiction on the court hearing such applications ‘where proceedings have already been, or 
may be, commenced on the substance of the case and even where those proceedings are to be 
conducted before arbitrators’.31 
Unsurprisingly, the problematical cases often concerned arbitration as an incidental matter to 
main proceedings that fell within the scope of Brussels I, such as the Syracuse proceedings in 
West Tankers. In the past, however, there was a mistaken opinion that such issues were 
unlikely to be problematical. For example, the Schlosser report, perhaps lacking a full 
appreciation of the complexity of proceedings involving arbitration as an incidental matter, 
stated that the difference in views ‘led to a different result in practice only in relation to one 
particular question, namely whether recognition and enforcement of a judgment could be 
refused in another state on the ground that the proceedings were brought in breach of an 
arbitration agreement’. As was seen above, and will be reiterated below, this proves to be 
somewhat over-optimistic and imprecise. 
The report also acknowledged that the problems in the interpretation of article 1(2)(d) would 
be addressed by (at the time) new Member States in the implementing legislation.32 This 
would be supported, it was stated, by the fact that the majority of Member States had acceded 
to the New York Convention 1958.33 It will be seen in section 7 of this article that whilst the 
New York Convention has led to a substantial harmonisation among signatory states in their 
                                                          
29 [1979] OJ C59 at p. 93. 
 
30 Case C-391/95, [1996] ECR I-7009, paragraph 32. 
 
31 Van Uden Maritime v Deco-Line, paragraph 34. 
 
32 The Schlosser Report, note 19, paragraph 61. 
 
33 Note 19. In more recent times, all Member States have acceded to the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958). 
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approach to the validity of arbitration agreements, there remain significant cultural and legal 
differences between the signatory states, including among the EU Member States. The danger 
in the above view is that Article 1(2)(d) will be influenced by national procedural law. It will 
also be seen in section 6 of this article that the test of scope was decisive when the European 
Court in West Tankers came to determine whether Brussels I was engaged so as to justify the 
application of the doctrine of effectiveness under EU law. 
 
4  The Ruling in West Tankers 
4.1 The Opinion of the Advocate-General 
There is little doubt about the correctness of Advocate-General Kokott’s opinion in the case. 
There were two key submissions made by the Advocate-General. Firstly, that exclusive 
jurisdiction to resolve a dispute by arbitration must be supported by a binding arbitration 
agreement. In West Tankers, the key inquiry was whether there was a valid arbitration 
agreement which included within its scope the type of claim that was brought by Allianz 
before the Syracuse court, namely the tortious claim. The matter was made complex due to 
the fact that the proceedings were brought in subrogation and based on Italian law. 
The second submission relates directly to the issuance of the anti-suit injunction. Advocate-
General Kokott stated that an anti-suit injunction would be “contrary to the principle of 
effective judicial protection which, according to settled case law, is a general principle of 
Community law and one of the fundamental rights protected in the Community …”.34 
The Advocate-General went on to say that ‘divergent decisions’, however exceptional, 
between arbitral tribunals and courts must be accepted. She thought however that “Instead of 
a solution by way of such coercive measures, ‘the anti-suit injunction’, a solution by way of 
law is called for. In that respect, only the inclusion of arbitration in the scheme of Regulation 
44/2001 could remedy the situation”. The Advocate-General’s opinion that anti-suit 
injunctions are contrary to the principle of effective judicial protection should be welcomed 
since it will increase the effectiveness of Brussels I instead of undermining it. However, it 
will be seen that Brussels I should not be used as a catalyst for greater harmonisation in the 
field of international commercial arbitration, a matter which the EU Council was determined 
                                                          
34 Note 31, paragraph 58. 
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to resist when it considered the amendments proposed by the EU Commission as a way to 
solve the problems caused by the interface between court litigation and arbitration within the 
system of Brussels I. 
It follows, first, as noted by Kokott AG in paragraph 57 of her opinion, that an anti-suit 
injunction, such as that in the main proceedings, is contrary to the general principle ‘that 
every court seised itself determines, under the rules applicable to it, whether it has 
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute before it’. Moreover, the Advocate-General stressed that 
the use of an anti-suit injunction would undermine the underlying principle of trust and 
confidence whose importance to the system of Brussels I was stressed in Turner v Grovit.35 
The Advocate-General rightly expressed her trust in national courts, stating that if an 
arbitration agreement were valid there would be no reason for a national court not to stay 
proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with Article II of the New York 
Convention 1958,36 to which all Member States are signatories, and whose supremacy over 
Brussels I is specifically confirmed in the revised version of the Regulation. 
 
4.2 The Judgment of the European Court 
The European Court made it clear that the proceedings in London concerning the anti-suit 
injunction fell outside the scope of Brussels I, as a result of the operation of Article 1(2)(d), 
since they were ancillary proceedings in support of arbitration. Despite this, the European 
Court found that such proceedings could still undermine the effectiveness of the Regulation. 
In particular, the court, relying on Marc Rich v Società Italiana Impianti,37 concluded that 
Brussels I applied to the Italian proceedings. Consequently, it ruled that the use of an anti-suit 
injunction “would amount to stripping that court of the power to rule on its own jurisdiction”, 
would undermine the ‘trust’ between Member States in the current system under the 
Regulation, and would deprive a party of access to a judicial remedy.38   
                                                          
35 Note 31, paragraph 24. 
 
36 Note 31, paragraph 73. 
 
37 Case C-190/89, [1991] ECR I-3855. 
 
38 For example, see recitals 1, 3, 16 and 17 of the original version of the Brussels I Regulation.  
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5. The Clash of Values between the System of Brussels I and International Commercial 
Arbitration: Why West Tankers was a Correct Decision 
In this section, the authors identify the policy considerations and rationale behind the West 
Tankers decision. It shows that the system of international commercial arbitration challenges 
two fundamental values of the Brussels I regime, which have been brought to the fore by 
West Tankers. This clash of values has become more prominent in recent years due to the 
increase in popularity of international commercial arbitration, which has become the most 
popular mechanism in western legal systems for the resolution of international commercial 
disputes. 
5.1  Theoretical Clash: Power Theory v Party Autonomy 
The first clash can be described as a clash of competing theories. In commercial litigation, the 
jurisdiction of a court over a dispute can be explained by two main theories. The first theory 
explains the court’s jurisdiction as an expression of power. Power theories envisage that 
jurisdiction in personam can be properly exercised over a defendant if the ‘legal order’ has, 
directly or indirectly, an effective hold over the defendant. There is little consideration for 
litigational fairness and convenience.39 For example, the Brussels I regime expresses this 
power by adopting the domicile principle as the default rule on exercise of jurisdiction by the 
court. In addition, its rejection of the forum non conveniens doctrine within the system of 
Brussels I strengthens the influence of the power theory.40 This is also explicit where there is 
a requirement of a certain nexus between the dispute and the state of the court seised of the 
dispute, such as a dispute envisaged by Articles 7(1) and (2) (ex 5(1) and (3). In these 
situations, adjudicatory jurisdiction must be based on the existence of a particularly close 
connecting factor between the putative forum and the dispute, which justifies derogation from 
the principle of ‘domicile’ in compliance with sound administration of justice and efficacy of 
proceedings.41 
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There is a close link between power theories and state sovereignty. “Jurisdiction is 
manifested as an exercise of power and is necessarily based upon a legal system invested 
with sovereignty. This interdependency explains why jurisdiction is defined and understood 
as a material and compulsory realisation of the legal order in a given case”.42 The English 
Court of Appeal, by confirming the anti-suit injunction, challenged the very foundation of 
power theories that is inherent in the system of Brussels I. 
The fairness theory, on the other hand, modifies the exercise of jurisdiction by introducing 
fairness and convenience considerations into the assessment.43 This theory often works in 
combination with the power theory. An example of this is the protective regime of the 
consumer under Articles 17-19 (ex 15-17) of Brussels I. There, for example, where all 
conditions are satisfied, the consumer can opt to bring proceedings against the business at the 
consumer’s domicile. Furthermore, businesses are prohibited from bringing proceedings 
other than at the place where the consumer is domiciled.44 
It is important to understand that both theories under the system of Brussels I will be applied 
in conjunction with the ethos of certainty of proceedings, which requires that a normally 
well-informed defendant be able to reasonably ‘foresee before which courts, other than those 
of the State in which he is domiciled, he may be sued’.45 This is very important because it 
shows that there is limited space in the system of Brussels I for judicial pragmatism. For 
example, in Gasser the European Court refused to entertain arguments based on convenience 
and fairness considerations, and favoured an approach which provides certainty of 
proceedings. In that case an Italian party started proceedings in Italy in breach of an exclusive 
choice of Austrian courts. There was a reasonable suspicion that the proceedings had been 
primarily motivated by the availability of dilatory tactics before the Italian court. The court 
decided that it would be contrary to the principles of mutual trust and certainty of 
proceedings to allow a court of a state to ignore the lis pendens provision simply because the 
                                                          
42 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department: Citizens’ Rights and 
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court first seised was either seised mainly for dilatory reasons by a debtor, or because the 
duration of proceedings in that forum were excessively long.46   
The system of international commercial arbitration on the other hand is founded on the 
autonomy theory. The jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is primarily established by consent, 
and relies on the theory of ‘party autonomy’,47 through the institution of contract.48 Thus the 
source of legitimacy of the tribunal’s jurisdiction is founded on contract.49 This theory has 
become entrenched and deeply rooted in the system of international commercial arbitration. 
Nevertheless, the power and fairness theories are not completely removed from the system of 
international commercial arbitration. Francis Mann stipulated that the autonomy of the parties 
and their rights and obligations are conferred on the parties by the virtue of a municipal legal 
system.50 Accordingly, party autonomy is not absolute, and national courts can still declare an 
arbitration agreement invalid, or interfere with a chosen arbitral procedure that contravenes 
due process.  
Based on Mann’s observation, and the practice of international commercial arbitration, an 
arbitration agreement can be declared invalid if, for example, it is found to be unfair. A 
dispute subject to a valid arbitration agreement can be declared non-arbitrable for public 
policy considerations at the seat of arbitration under Article II(3) of the New York 
Convention 1958, or when considering a challenge to the recognition and enforcement of an 
award under Article V(2)(b) of the Convention.  Thus, one can begin to see how power and 
fairness theories play a role in delineating the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. It is 
however important to note that the role of the fairness and power theories seems to be 
ancillary to the main ethos of party autonomy, which is said to dominate and inform the 
practice of international commercial arbitration. Lew, for example, argues that party 
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autonomy remains the driving force of arbitration, and therefore the influence of national law 
and national courts is greatly reduced.51  
This theoretical clash explains why it is somewhat difficult for a national court to decline 
jurisdiction in favour of the arbitral tribunal when such exercise is required under Brussels I. 
It is not an assessment of what best serves the interest of the parties. Rather, it is an 
assessment of what best serves the system of Brussels I in the greater scheme of the internal 
market. 
5.2 Community Interest v Disputants’ Interest 
Secondly, and being a derivative of the first value, Brussels I is fundamentally founded on the 
principle of ‘mutual trust’ that each state accords to the legal system and judicial institutions 
of the other contracting states. It is this mutual trust that enables a compulsory system of 
jurisdiction which all courts must respect.52 This value expresses the EU’s integrationist 
aspiration, and the primary objective of Brussels I of eliminating conflicting court decisions, 
and improving the functioning of the internal market as envisaged under Article 65 of the 
TFEU. 
The system of international commercial arbitration, on the other hand, is driven by private 
values. The main task entrusted to arbitrators is the resolution of the dispute between the 
disputants. This has been aptly described by Lord Hoffman in West Tankers. He stated that 
'People engaged in commerce choose arbitration in order to be outside the procedures 
of any national court. They frequently prefer the privacy, informality and absence of any 
prolongation of the dispute by appeal which arbitration offers. Nor is it only a matter of 
procedure. The choice of arbitration may affect the substantive rights of the parties, giving 
the arbitrators the right to act as amiables compositeurs, apply broadly equitable 
considerations, even a lex mercatoria which does not wholly reflect any national system of 
law. The principle of autonomy of the parties should allow them these choices'.53 
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The system of international commercial arbitration accordingly has evolved over the years 
into a system which is normatively aligned with values that seek the optimisation of 
procedural efficiency, a movement hitherto to the private sphere and at times at the expense 
of constitutional values.54 Thus, there has been a gradual shift of power to the tribunal in 
matters such as the determination of the competence of the tribunal, review of competence, 
access to justice, the procedure itself, the control of arbitral awards, and recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards. There has further been a process of internationalisation of 
arbitration law in certain jurisdictions by aligning local law to the demands of international 
practice and international comity.55  
Returning to West Tankers, a key argument which was presented by West Tankers was that 
the Italian proceedings were inefficient and constituted in part dilatory tactics by the Italian 
party. The shipowners demanded a response from an English court to safeguard procedural 
efficiency and prevent parallel proceedings that were clearly highly complex and expensive. 
Lord Hoffman and Lord Mance supported such a request in their speech when making the 
preliminary reference to the European Court.56 However, the European Court reminded us of 
a clash that is underlined by a mixture of philosophical and normative stands, that far exceed 
and which are more valuable than the disputants’ own interest in having their dispute 
resolved by a choice which had arguably been made in the arbitration agreement, and which 
would have been, under normal conditions, a more efficient and suitable mechanism with 
which to resolve the dispute. The European Court reasoned that under the principle of mutual 
trust, explained above, the English court should trust that the Italian court seised of the 
parallel proceedings would stay or decline proceedings should the proceedings before it be 
brought in breach of a valid and binding arbitration agreement.57 
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6.  Efficiency of Arbitral Proceedings v Constitutionalism of EU Law 
In West Tankers, the European Court held inter alia that the use of an anti-suit injunction by 
the House of Lords would deprive a party of access to a judicial remedy.58 
The requirement of effectiveness is a fundamental legal principle of EU law.59 This principle, 
which is also referred to under the notions of effective judicial protection or effet utile, is a 
rule used by the European Court in the interpretation of treaties and more particularly in the 
interpretation of EU law.60 The principle was developed by the European Court as a general 
legal obligation for national courts to give adequate effect to EU law in their case decisions.61 
Namely, it is applied so that national procedural law gives adequate effect to rights and 
remedies derived from EU legislation. Moreover, this principle sets up the rule that national 
courts must not make the enforcement of EU rights impossible or excessively difficult.62 
Henceforth, the principle of effectiveness enables the European Court to draw and give effect 
to the aims and purpose of the  various legislative texts that constitute the bulk of EU law.63 
The importance of the requirement of effectiveness emerged in the 1990s in a number of 
cases, including the leading case of Factortame I.64 This requirement has gained prominence 
in the European Court’s decisions, as there was a need to balance the national procedural 
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autonomy of the courts and the need to enforce the effectiveness of EU rights.65 It was held in 
Factortame I that any national legal provision or any legislative, administrative or judicial 
practice which might impair the effectiveness of EU law and prevent it from being 
implemented fully is incompatible with EU law.66 In this case, the European Court placed 
strict emphasis on the application and implementation of the principle of effectiveness and on 
the importance of the right to effective judicial protection under EU law.67 This decision has 
thereafter established a robust application of the principle by the European Court when 
interpreting and applying EU law.  
The legal foundations of the principle can be found in Article 47 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights which provides that “everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in 
compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.” The European Court relies on this 
provision as a foundation for the application of the principle of effectiveness.68 Therefore, the 
principle of effectiveness enables an effective protection of individuals’ rights and remedies 
arising out of EU law. More particularly, the principle enforces the right to an effective 
remedy to which individuals are entitled in respect of rights ensuing from EU law. In 
addition, Article 19 TFEU (ex Article 220 EC) provides that national courts are under a duty 
to ensure the right to an effective remedy when applying EU law. It states that: “Member 
States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields 
covered by Union law.” Pursuant to this provision, national courts applying the right to an 
effective remedy will have to ensure that national remedies that are available under national 
civil procedure do not compromise the right to an effective remedy.69 
6.1 Effectiveness of EU Law and Access to Justice 
In order for the courts to enforce the principle of effective judicial protection of rights arising 
from EU law, the individuals would need to have the right of access to justice. This is also 
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safeguarded by Article 6 of the ECHR, which disposes of the right of access to justice.70 The 
European Court has also derived from its interpretation of Article 47 of the EUCFR that it 
addresses both the need to safeguard access to justice, and to enforce effective judicial 
remedies.71 The European Court’s position on the connection between the right of access to 
justice and securing adequate remedies pursuant to EU law was illustrated in cases such as 
Heylens,72 Tele273 and Mono Car Styling.74 In these cases, the European Court held that the 
right of access to justice is at the basis of the enforcement of EU law rights and that it is 
therefore a crucial element in the application of this legal system.75 
 
6.2 Engaging access to a remedy and access to justice in the system of Brussels I 
EU constitutional principles had a bearing on the court’s reasoning not to allow the use of 
anti-suit injunctions when Brussels I is engaged in two ways. Firstly, the European Court 
declared that an anti-suit injunction is incompatible with Brussels I because the Tribunale di 
Siracusa was not given the chance to decide on its own jurisdiction in accordance with the 
provisions of Brussels I76. 
Secondly, the European Court reasoned that the anti-suit injunction restrained the subrogated 
insurer from commencing and continuing proceedings before the Italian court. This prevented 
the party from being able to benefit from an adequate protection of its rights by access to the 
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Italian court for a remedy through engaging Article 5(3) (now Article 7(2)) of Brussels I. As 
a result, this undermined the insurer’s right of access to justice and access to effective 
remedies and effective judicial protection which are facilitated by Brussels I, and enshrined 
as fundamental principles under Article 47 EUCFR. Consequently, the right to effective 
remedies, namely the right to obtaining an effective judicial protection as a result of the 
applicability of Brussels I, was undermined by the anti-suit injunction in this case, thereby 
undermining the effectiveness of Brussels I. 
It is worthwhile noting that there was nothing controversial in West Tankers’ application of 
the principle of effectiveness or effective judicial protection, even if the anti-suit injunction 
was aimed at protecting arbitral proceedings which are perfectly able to safeguard access to 
an effective remedy, albeit not judicial. The European Court simply reiterated Member 
States’ obligations to respect EU constitutional principles.   
It is worth pointing out that it is not the mere referral to arbitration that the anti-suit 
injunction had set out to achieve which was controversial in terms of access to justice, as it 
goes without saying that under established case law it is recognised that arbitration as a 
system of dispute resolution satisfies the constitutional requirement of access to justice.77 It is 
however the denial of access to the remedies provided under Brussels I that was at issue. The 
EU Commission’s proposal, which will be seen below, would have mitigated the potential for 
such a clash between referral to arbitration and Brussels I. However, as explained above and 
as will be seen in the following sections of this chapter, Brussels I is not the ideal forum for 
deepening EU harmonisation in the field of international commercial arbitration.  
7.  National and International Law Responses to Parallel Proceedings 
The above discussion highlights that the relationship between Brussels I and arbitration 
should be confined to an inquiry of scope. In this section, the authors provide analysis of 
existing provisions under international and national law that may have a bearing on the issues 
presented in West Tankers. It demonstrates the diversity between national laws on key aspects 
that arise during parallel proceedings between court and arbitration. It analyses the doctrines 
of ‘negative competence-competence’, and the ‘prima facie review’ under international law 
and through a comparative analysis of national arbitration laws, and demonstrates that a 
permissive application of these doctrines would hold the answer to averting costly 
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proceedings such as those experienced in West Tankers. The degree of acceptance of these 
doctrines in a given legal system essentially determines the level of deference accorded to the 
arbitral tribunal.   
Furthermore, the analysis helps the reader to appreciate why a solution under international 
law, or co-ordinated international reform, has a better prospect of removing the risk of 
lengthy parallel proceedings than a solution within the system of Brussels I, whilst at the 
same time preserving the values of Brussels I. 
The doctrine of ‘prima facie review’ is widely understood to mean that the court will stay or 
decline jurisdiction unless it is ‘manifest’ that the arbitration agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed. The attraction of a prima facie review is that it 
should prevent dilatory tactics, and improve the efficiency of arbitration by deferring the full 
review of the validity of the arbitration agreement to the arbitral tribunal.  The shortcomings 
of such an approach however are that the court will not have the opportunity to finally deal 
with any objections as to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, and which at a later date may prove 
to be expensive.78   
The doctrine of ‘negative competence-competence’ on the other hand, which is relevant to 
the doctrine of ‘prima facie review’, stipulates that in addition to the almost universal rule 
that the arbitral tribunal has the competence to decide on its own competence, including the 
validity of the arbitration agreement, there is an implied promise that the national court will 
not determine its jurisdiction on the matter which is subject to an arbitration agreement prior 
to the arbitral tribunal’s making a decision on its own jurisdiction.79 In the example of West 
Tankers, an application of the doctrine of negative competence-competence would have 
required the Italian court to stay proceedings until the London arbitral tribunal had had a 
chance to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement that was contested by the 
claimant before the Italian courts.  
Thus, it will be seen in the following discussion that the solution to the procedural 
inefficiencies experienced at West Tankers can be significantly mitigated by a co-ordinated 
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reform to national or international law in order to accord a higher degree of deference to the 
arbitral tribunal. 
7.1  International Law and International Documents 
The international law response to parallel proceedings between court and arbitration, or the 
risk of it occurring, is primarily addressed in Article II(3) of the New York Convention 1958, 
which requires a national court to stay proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration 
agreement and to order the parties to resort to arbitration. In most cases, this provision would 
be sufficient in itself to help avoid parallel proceedings and potentially inconsistent decisions 
involving similar or related matters. Article II (3) of the NYC 1958 states that: 
“The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which 
the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of 
one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”80 
The New York Convention, being the only international law treaty on this issue, has played 
an important role in mitigating the procedural inefficiencies associated with the West Tankers 
saga. It has been consistently accepted by courts and commentators that Article II(3) is a 
mandatory article, and national courts have no discretion on whether or not to grant a stay of 
proceedings when all conditions of Article II(3) have been met. Moreover, it is worthwhile 
pointing out that given the pro-enforcement attitude of courts to the New York Convention 
1958, courts have followed a restrictive approach when applying the exceptions to the 
requirement to stay proceedings which are listed in the second indent of Article II(3); that is, 
in the assessment by the court seised of whether the arbitration agreement is “null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed’.81 
However, the New York Convention 1958 has its shortcomings. It is not clear from the 
language of the Convention, which was drafted over 50 years ago, whether the Convention 
calls for the negative effect of the competence-competence principle, or whether it calls for a 
simple positive requirement to stay proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration 
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agreement. It is important to highlight here that the European Court explicitly stated in West 
Tankers that its decision does not contradict the New York Convention. Accordingly, there is 
an implicit acknowledgment in this decision that the Convention does not call for a negative 
effect empowering a constituted arbitral tribunal to have the first say on the validity of the 
arbitration agreements and its competence. Otherwise, the New York Convention would have 
prevailed by virtue of Article 71 of Brussels I, and now under the specific reference in Article 
73(2) of the revised version of Brussels I. 
Moreover, there is nothing in the language of the New York Convention to suggest that 
courts should limit themselves to a prima facie review of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement. Whilst it is rational for a court other than a court of the chosen seat, such as in the 
case of Italian proceedings in West Tankers, to follow a prima facie approach, the NewYork 
Convention (unless given a creative interpretation) does not call for such an obligation.82 
Furthermore, the international approach as represented under the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
which is a seminal international document aiming at the harmonisation of international 
commercial arbitration laws, does not provide a clear answer. The main provisions that have 
a direct bearing on the prima facie review and negative competence-competence approaches 
are contained in Articles 8 and 16 of the Model Law respectively.  
The drafting history of the Model Law shows that the negotiating parties were divided as to 
the extent of review of the validity, operativeness, performability, and applicability of the 
arbitration agreement.83 During the drafting process of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the 
UNCITRAL Working Group proposed limiting the application of the second indent of Article 
8 to situations where the arbitration agreement is found to be “manifestly null and void’’84 
[emphasis added], in what would arguably have been a step closer to adopting a prima facie 
review of the validity of the arbitration agreements.85 However, the final text omitted such an 
addition. 
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Furthermore, the drafting history shows that there was disagreement as to whether the 
competence-competence principle should also include its negative implication discussed 
above. For example, the US delegates preferred a text that would allow the arbitral tribunal to 
decide on its jurisdiction first. This was met by objections from the representative of the 
United Kingdom, who favoured a text which would allow the national court to finally 
determine the tribunal’s jurisdiction.86The final version of Article 8 of the Model Law did not 
include any explicit stipulation that categorically resolves this issue. The same can be said in 
relation to Article 16 of the Model Law, which adopts a restrained version of the competence-
competence principle, without making an explicit adoption of the doctrine of ‘negative 
competence-competence’.  
The above discussion demonstrates that the position of these doctrines under international 
norms is, to put it mildly, contentious. The reader will see further that as a result, national 
arbitration laws are divided in their approach.  
7.2  Comparative National Laws of EU Member States 
The West Tankers saga has exposed the diversity in approach among courts of Member States 
in relation to the degree of deference which they are willing to confer on the arbitral tribunal 
when deciding the jurisdictional issue. One cannot escape the conclusion that the practice of 
international commercial arbitration can be highly parochial at times. On one side of the 
spectrum are national laws that have little regard for the ‘prima facie review’, and ‘negative 
competence-competence’ doctrines, such as is the case under Italian arbitration law. On the 
other side of the spectrum are national laws, such as French arbitration law, which allow 
great deference to the arbitral tribunal, and adopt with minimum reservations the doctrines of 
‘prima facie review’ and negative competence-competence. We will now turn to the analysis 
of certain national arbitration laws of selected Member States in order to demonstrate this 
diversity. 
French arbitration law is considered to fall on the far end of the spectrum and adopts an 
approach that is characteristic of the pro-arbitration attitude of French arbitration law in the 
context of international arbitration. Article 1448 of French Arbitration Act stipulates that: 
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 “When a dispute subject to an arbitration agreement is brought before a court, such court 
shall decline jurisdiction, except if an arbitral tribunal has not yet been seized of the dispute 
and if the arbitration agreement is manifestly void or manifestly not applicable”. 
According to Article 1448, the court must decline jurisdiction and refer parties to arbitration 
where a tribunal has been seised of the dispute.87 This is a strong application of the doctrine 
of negative competence-competence. Furthermore, Article 1448 only requires a prima facie 
review of the validity of the arbitration agreement, as opposed to a full review of the merits, 
where a tribunal has not been seised of the dispute.  
Turning to Italian law, which can best be described as falling on the other side of the 
spectrum, one can see that at the time of the proceedings in West Tankers, Italian law had 
little regard for the doctrines of negative competence-competence, and prima facie review. 
However since 2007 Italian law has been amended with a view to improving, inter alia, the 
efficiency of proceedings involving parallel proceedings between court actions and 
arbitration. Article 819 of the amended Italian Arbitration Act stipulates that parties 
contesting the competence of an ordinary judge, such as in the Syracuse proceedings, can 
approach the Corte di Cassazione for a speedy and final ruling on the competence of the 
judge.88 This approach is a far more favourable provision to international arbitration and the 
issue of parallel proceedings than that which was applicable at the time of the Syracuse 
proceedings. Admittedly this is not a clear adoption of any of the doctrines discussed above. 
However, it is a step closer to improving procedural efficiency in situations similar to the 
Italian West Tankers proceedings.  
English law is located in the middle ground of the spectrum. Section 9 of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 does not explicitly recognise any of the doctrines discussed above. In 
principle, English courts have favoured a full judicial review of the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal. Recent cases, however, suggest that there is a judicial movement towards allowing 
greater deference to the arbitral tribunal. The court in Fiona Trust89 indicated that it was a 
matter of preference to allow the tribunal to resolve issues surrounding its jurisdiction first. 
                                                          
87Graves, J., pp. 116-117. 
 
88 Abell, L., Note and Comment: Disarming the Italian Torpedo: the 2006 Italian Arbitration Law Reforms as a 
Small Step Toward Resolving the West Tankers Dilemma (2013) 24 American Review of International 
Arbitration 335 at 355.  
 
89 Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and Others v. Privalov and Others [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 267. 
 
 28 
Whilst this is not yet a turning point in the jurisprudence of English courts, it nonetheless 
signifies a movement towards a readiness to accept the doctrine of negative competence-
competence.  
The above discussion supports the opening submission of this Article that solutions or partial 
solutions of the challenges experienced in West Tankers are available or could be made 
available through the operation of national law. National law, in accordance with its attitude 
to international arbitration, can determine the degree of deference that it is willing to entrust 
to the arbitral tribunal. The degree of friendliness of national courts to international 
arbitration can be enhanced either through a process of national reform, or by greater co-
ordination at the international level. Furthermore, these conclusions further support the 
authors’ early submission that Brussels I must not be interpreted or reformed in a manner that 
would be a catalyst to a deeper harmonisation of national arbitration law, however useful that 
might seem for the efficiency of proceedings.  
Against the backdrop of national and international arbitration approaches, we now turn to 
examine the changes that have been brought by the revised version of Brussels I, which 
entered into force in January 2015. 
8.  The Recast Brussels I 
West Tankers exposed a clash between the system of international commercial arbitration and 
Brussels I. It also showed that when EU law is engaged, such a clash will be resolved in 
favour of EU law. It should be emphasised however that, as a matter of EU and national 
policy, this clash should be avoided, since it is in the EU’s “commercial interests” that 
international arbitration is safeguarded.90 It should also be emphasised that at the time of the 
revision of Brussels I, it was high on the agenda of the EU Commission to find a solution to 
the interface between court litigation and arbitration. Thus, the revised Brussels I91 reflects in 
part an EU response to the issues arising from West Tankers, which were deemed to be 
unacceptable. 
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The European Commission engaged in wide consultation with various stakeholders regarding 
the relationship between Brussels I and arbitration. The process included a Green Paper,92 
and numerous communications between EU institutions highlighting in part that a solution 
must be found to the problems experienced in West Tankers.93 The Commission found that 
many stakeholders were in favour of further action to be taken by the EU in order to avoid 
parallel proceedings between courts and arbitration, and to prevent ‘abusive litigation tactics’. 
However, views diverged among stakeholders of whether the proper solution should be made 
through the exclusion of arbitration ‘more broadly from the scope of the Regulation’,94 or 
whether concrete substantive revisions should be included so as to harmonise the national law 
approach to parallel proceedings between court litigation and arbitration. 
In an early draft, the EU Commission endorsed the latter view and recommended the addition 
to Brussels I in Article 29(4) of the following text:  “a court seised of a dispute shall stay 
proceedings if its jurisdiction was contested on the basis of an arbitration agreement, and an 
arbitral tribunal has been seised of the case, or in cases where court proceedings relating to 
the arbitration agreement had been commenced in the Member States of the seat”. 
Undoubtedly, this proposal would have created an EU tool having a similar effect to the 
doctrine of ‘negative competence-competence’. 
The EU Council rejected the proposed addition. Instead, the final version placed emphasis on 
reforms to the recitals of Brussels I. Notable changes were introduced to the recitals, which 
have arguably limited the scope of Brussels I in situations concerning arbitration. 
Furthermore, no changes were made to Article 1(2)(d) of Brussels I.  
One cannot explain with great certainty why the European Council rejected the European 
Commission’s proposal in Article 29(4) discussed above. However, from a policy 
perspective, the Council’s approach reiterated that arbitration has its jurisprudential 
foundations in national law. This remains the case despite an increasing movement towards 
greater internationalisation of arbitration through permissive reading of national law, 
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international harmonisation, and often through a process of delocalisation.95 Furthermore, 
despite critiques apportioning blame to Brussels I, the problems arising from West Tankers in 
relation to parallel proceedings have been caused primarily by the diversity among Member 
States in their approach to the interface between court litigation and arbitration. 
The EU Council’s view avoided a situation where the relationship between Brussels I and 
international arbitration would become one of substance rather than of scope. The former 
would unduly interfere with a Member State’s legitimate legislative space, which is 
demonstrably diverse on the issue of parallel proceedings between courts and arbitration.96 If 
the European Union is to go down the route of further harmonisation in the field of 
international commercial arbitration, it must be done holistically and in such a way as not to 
discriminate between those proceedings which fall within the scope of Brussels I, and those 
which do not.  
 
8.2  The Main Changes introduced in the Recitals  
The changes introduced in the recitals will not remove the risk of the occurrence of situations 
similar to West Tankers. What they do instead is reiterate EU jurisprudence on the 
relationship between arbitration and Brussels I. Nevertheless, the recitals will have a notable 
impact on the recognition and enforcement of a Member State’s judgment concerning the 
validity of an arbitration agreement. 
The recitals reiterate that recast Brussels I ‘should not’ apply to arbitration. However, recast 
Brussels I confirms that proceedings such as those brought before the Italian court in West 
Tankers are not prevented by virtue of the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of Brussels 
I. Thus Recital 12(a) specifies that nothing prevents “courts of a Member State, when seised 
of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration 
agreement, from referring the parties to arbitration, from staying or dismissing the 
proceedings, or from examining whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed, in accordance with their national law”.  
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Furthermore, Recital 12(d) confirms the rationale in Marc Rich and states that Brussels I 
“should not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings relating to, in particular, the 
establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration 
procedure or any other aspects of such a procedure, nor to any action or judgment 
concerning the annulment, review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award”. 
Given that no amendments have been made to the original text of Brussels I that deal with 
anti-suit injunctions, it is safe to submit that the reasoning in West Tankers has survived the 
reforms made in the revised Brussels I.97 
8.3  Enforcement of a Judgment given in a Member State on the Validity of an 
Arbitration Agreement 
Perhaps the most notable clarification made in the revised Brussels I relates to the 
enforceability of a judgment determining the validity of an arbitration agreement. Recital 
12(b) states that: 
“A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration agreement 
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should not be subject to the 
rules of recognition and enforcement laid down in this Regulation, regardless of whether the 
court decided on this as a principal issue or as an incidental question”. 
Despite the non-binding nature of Recital 1298, the above quoted statement is bound to have a 
substantial impact on the approach that national courts have towards the enforcement of a 
ruling given by a court of a Member State on the validity of an arbitration agreement. The 
recital expressly states that judgments on the validity of an arbitration agreement do not fall 
within the scope of Brussels I. Recital 12 makes clear that it is not be possible to enforce a 
judgment given by a court of a Member State which concerns the validity of an arbitration 
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agreement. National Navigation v Endsea (The Wadi Sudr) 99 is a good example of a situation 
the aforementioned recital is intended to address. 
In The Wadi Sudr, the central issue was whether a judgment of a Spanish court declaring that 
there was no binding arbitration agreement between the disputants was to be recognised and 
enforced under Article 33(1) of the original version of Brussels I. The decision by the 
Spanish court concerned whether or not an arbitration agreement was incorporated into the 
bill of lading which had been concluded between the parties. The Spanish court held that the 
arbitration clause was not incorporated into the contract and rejected the claim that it had no 
jurisdiction. 
The respondent then started arbitral proceedings in London based on the claim that the 
arbitration clause was incorporated into the bill of lading pursuant to English law, and sought 
an anti-suit injunction against any other claim to be filed through court proceedings. On the 
respondent’s application, the English Commercial Court ruled that the judgment by the 
Spanish Court regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement was not binding, as 
arbitration is excluded from the scope of Brussels I pursuant to Article 1(2)(d).  
The decision of the Commercial Court was reversed by the Court of Appeal, which held that, 
following West Tankers, a preliminary ruling is a judgment within the meaning of the 
Regulation if it takes place in proceedings the main scope of which brings them within the 
Regulation, thus essentially reiterating the rationale in Marc Rich and its progeny.100 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal recognised and gave effect to the judgment of the Spanish 
Court. 
In summary, Recital 12 of the recast Brussels I Regulation has refined the rules concerning 
the interface between arbitration and court proceedings. This clarification is an innovation as 
courts of Member States will not be under any duty to recognise or enforce judgments by 
courts of other Member States which concern the validity of arbitration agreements, and 
therefore will be able to avoid Wadi Sudr-like situations from ensuing. By doing so, the 
revised Brussels I has recognised the legitimate national space of determining the validity of 
the arbitration agreement, especially in those systems which allow a great degree of deference 
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to the arbitral tribunal on the issue of the tribunal’s competence. By doing so, the revised 
Brussels I has reminded us that the relationship between Brussels I and arbitration is 
essentially one of scope.  
8.4  Parallel Judicial and Arbitral Proceedings: An Unresolved Problem 
Subsequent to the European Court’s judgment in West Tankers, the London arbitral tribunal 
was called upon to decide on two issues. Firstly, whether Allianz and Generali would have to 
pay damages for breach of the arbitration agreement. Secondly, the Tribunal was called upon 
to issue an indemnity order in an attempt to pre-empt a possible success of Allianz and 
Generali in the Syracuse proceedings. The tribunal, recognising that this was a matter which 
fell within its jurisdiction, concluded that this jurisdiction was circumscribed by the decision 
in West Tankers.  
The Tribunal stated that it was under a duty to apply Community law. The tribunal stated that 
“the ruling by the European Court means that insurers have the right under European law to 
bring proceedings in Syracuse. Accordingly it seems to us that a decision by this tribunal that 
insurers did not have that right would be impossible to sustain if the matter were tested again 
before the European Court. A competition between the right upheld by the European Court 
and the right to damages would, in the present state of Community law, result in a victory for 
the former. And this is so despite the specific provision in Article 1(2)(d)”.101 
The English High Court, however, allowed the appeal under section 69 of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 and held that “A related issue is whether European law required the 
arbitral tribunal to decline jurisdiction to grant damages or an indemnity, as the majority of 
the tribunal considered it should. In my judgment, the tribunal erred in reaching that 
conclusion. I accept Mr Bailey's submission that whilst the tribunal was bound to apply 
European law as part of English law, the tribunal would only have to apply the principle of 
effective judicial protection if it were engaged, which it was not, for the reasons he gave”.102 
The High Court was correct in reaching its decision, and in its reading of West Tankers. The 
principle of effectiveness would not have been undermined in this case, as the European 
Court in West Tankers did not hold that the existence or enforcement of the arbitration 
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agreement was in breach of Brussels I. Rather, it was held in West Tankers that impeding the 
right of the competent court to issue a judgment on its jurisdiction through the anti-suit 
injunction had undermined the right of access to justice and the principle of effective judicial 
protection. Thus, the principle of effectiveness was undermined to the extent that the anti-suit 
injunction had obstructed the application of the rights ensuing from Brussels I, and not as a 
result of the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. Since proceedings principally 
concerning arbitration fall outside the scope of Brussels I, there would not have been a breach 
of the principle of effective judicial protection should an indemnity have been granted by the 
arbitral tribunal for the breach of the arbitration agreement by Allianz and Generali. 
Consequently, it could be said that the claim for damages regarding the breach of the 
arbitration agreement by Allianz and Generali would not affect or undermine the 
effectiveness of Brussels I. 
The revised Brussels I supports the reasoning of the English High Court. Firstly, Recital 12 
affirms the possibility of conflicting decisions between a court judgment and an arbitral 
award concerning the same matter. Recital 12(c) recognises that “where a court of a Member 
State, exercising jurisdiction under this Regulation or under national law, has determined 
that an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, 
this should not preclude that court’s judgment on the substance of the matter from being 
recognised or, as the case may be, enforced in accordance with this Regulation”.103 Equally, 
the revised Brussels I confirms the supremacy of the New York Convention 1958 over 
Brussels I, and further states in Recital 12(c) that a Member State can recognise and enforce a 
foreign arbitral award in accordance with the NYC 1958 despite this potentially being in 
conflict with a judgment of a Member State. 
Be this as it may, a court seised of a request for the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award, may, at the request of the party challenging the award, refuse recognition and 
enforcement of that award if evidence is furnished by the challenger that the arbitration 
agreement upon which the award was based is invalid under the law to which the parties had 
subjected it, or in the absence of a choice, the law at the place where the award was made.104 
This arguably brings us back to square one, and an inevitable conclusion can be made that 
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parallel proceedings between court proceedings and arbitration are here to stay, and that the 
solution resides in bringing national laws into greater harmony as alluded to in Section 7 of 
this Article. 
8.5 The irreconcilability between an award and a judgment: A missed opportunity 
What is most disappointing in the revised Brussels I is its failure to respond to a possible 
situation where a national court is faced with irreconcilable decisions, one being an arbitral 
award and the other a court judgment. As an example, consider the situation where an 
English court is faced with two applications, one for the enforcement of a French arbitral 
award, and the other for the enforcement of an Italian judgment, both relating to the same 
matter, and the award and judgment involve contradictory conclusions as to whether there has 
been a breach of the substantive contract involved. Neither the original nor the new Brussels I 
Regulation, nor the New York Convention 1958, specifically addresses this problem in its 
text.  
 
On the one hand, an English court pursuing a policy of supporting of international 
commercial arbitration will favour the enforcement of the arbitral award. On the other hand, 
the principle of effectiveness of EU law requires the giving of adequate consideration to 
Brussels I, and thus enforcement of the judgment of a Member State in accordance with the 
provisions of Brussels I. Be this as it may, the English court, faced with such a conflict, will 
have to come up with a solution. It is submitted here that where it considers the arbitration 
agreement to be valid, the English court should have recourse to English public policy, and 
accordingly prefer the earlier of the decisions (utilising the public policy provisions in both 
the New York Convention 1958, and Brussels I).105 This approach is supported by the revised 
Brussels I, which explicitly gives supremacy to the New York Convention over Brussels I in 
situations falling within the scope of the latter, and therefore it indicates that on the matter of 
the irreconcilability between an arbitral award and a court judgment, the New York 
Convention should prevail.106 
 
Whatever the best answer to this problem may be, the omission of the revised Brussels I to 
address the problem in clear terms seems irresponsible, and a missed opportunity. 
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9. Conclusion  
Brussels I has been loyal to the harmonisation of jurisdictional rules in civil and commercial 
matters among Member States, whilst respecting arbitration by carefully delineating its scope 
and safeguarding the autonomous nature of arbitration. Inevitably, however, and most 
uncommonly, a clash between the two spheres will occur.  
This article demonstrates that it is not the exclusion of arbitration that is most worrying, but 
rather the prolonged parallel and potentially conflicting proceedings that had been 
experienced in West Tankers, and which are here to stay. This is demonstrably a matter that 
Brussels I and the system of international commercial arbitration have strived, albeit with 
limited success, to avert. The revised Brussels I should not be treated as a magic bullet and 
will not entirely remove such a risk. However, it has brought some clarity with regard to the 
situations when arbitration is to be excluded from the scope of the system of Brussels I. 
West Tankers exposed the weakness in the system of international commercial arbitration and 
the (all too often ignored) parochial character of international commercial arbitration. We 
have emphasised that the solution to the diversity in the treatment by national laws of parallel 
judicial and arbitral proceedings should not be attained under the system of Brussels I. 
Instead, the authors have demonstrated that solutions already exist under certain national 
laws. Whilst these alone will not avert the irreconcilable conflict caused by the interface 
between court litigation and arbitration, which was at the heart of the dispute in West 
Tankers, these could however inspire greater co-ordination among Member States in view of 
deeper harmonisation.  In particular, according greater deference to the arbitral tribunal 
should mitigate the inefficiencies that arise when the systems of international commercial 
arbitration, and Brussels I, collide. 
 
